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The Vital Need to Eliminate a De Facto Negligence 
Standard Under Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act 
 




A. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
 
Able to obtain large fees for little work, the plaintiffs’ bar has 
made the filing of ‘merger objection’ lawsuits increasingly routine.  
In 2008, approximately 54% of all public M&A deals were 
challenged . . .  This number rose sharply to 86% in 2009, and 
continued to rise until its peak of 94% in 2013 . . .  The percentage 
of deals subject to suit hovered between 85% and 90% through 
2015 . . . experts project that this trend will continue.1 
 
In Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp. (“Varjabedian”), the Ninth Circuit 
held that a claim for failure to satisfy a statutory disclosure provision 
concerning tender offers only requires pleading “. . . negligence, not 
scienter [intent].”2  A tender offer, means an offer by an acquiring company 
to pay a cash price per share for the shares of the target company, here 
Emulex, in order to acquire the target company.3 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Varjabedian creates a clear 
disagreement and a split with five other circuits (i.e., the Second, Third, 
Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh), all of which have held that a Section 14(e) 
claim requires proof of scienter,4 with scienter having been the required 
 
 * J.D. Candidate 2019, Emory University School of Law; M.B.A. Candidate 2019, Emory 
University Goizueta School of Business; B.S.B.A. Business Management and Entrepreneurship 2015, 
The University of Arizona.  The author would like to thank Professor Joanna Shepherd for her valuable 
insight and advice in the research and writing of this Article. 
 1.  Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association as Amicus Curiae at 9, 12, 
Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp. (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. pending, No. 18-459 (U.S. Nov. 13, 
2018) [hereinafter Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association]. 
 2. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 888 F.3d 399 (9th 
Cir. 2018), cert. pending, (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459; see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. 185, 196-97 (1976). 
 3. THOMAS L. HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1, 245 (4th ed. 2016); see also 
Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d at 402. 
 4. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d at 409–410. 
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standard of culpability for nearly half a century.5  The relevant provision in 
Varjabedian is Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 
“1934 Act” or “Exchange Act”),6 which prohibits untrue statements or 
omissions of material facts in connection with a tender offer (i.e., an 
acquisition strategy).7  This Article will focus on the Ninth Circuit’s 
unexpected Section 14(e) holding. 
On October 11, 2018, Emulex filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 
primarily requesting Supreme Court review of the Section 14(e) question.8  
Emulex’s petition for certiorari further highlights the radical shift following 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding, stating the following: 
 
For the first fifty years of Section 14(e)’s existence, therefore, 
there was uniform recognition in circuits across the country that 
Section 14(e) does not support a private right of action or remedy 
based on mere negligence, . . . [as] ‘no federal court ha[d] held that 
§ 14(e) requires only a showing a negligence.’  However, the Ninth 
Circuit blew up that consensus.9 
 
Separate amicus curiae briefs were filed on November 13, 2018, by the 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America.10  Respondents timely filed 
their brief for the respondents in opposition on November 30, 2018.11  Then 
on December 18, 2018, the Petitioners’ reply brief was timely filed, setting 
the stage for review.12  On January 4, 2019, the Supreme Court granted 
Emulex’s petition for certiorari.13 
 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(e) (2012). 
 7. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d at 409–10; see also Aaron F. Miner et al., Supreme 
Court Has Opportunity to Reexamine Implied Private Right of Action Under Section 14(e) of the 
Exchange Act, ARNOLD & PORTER (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/ 
publications/2018/10/scotus-has-opportunity-to-reexamine [perma.cc/DQ3J-V8XP]. 
 8. Aurora Barnes, Petitions of the week, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.scotus 
blog.com/2018/11/petitions-of-the-week-18/ [perma.cc/XK9X-CPPP]. 
 9. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1, 
14 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459. 
 10. Barnes, supra note 8. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, at 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), reply brief for the 
Petitioners filed, 1, 11 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459. 
 13. Public Information Office Supreme Court of the United States, A Reporter’s Guide to 
Applications Pending Before the Supreme Court of the United States 1, 16, (2018), https://www.sup 
remecourt.gov/publicinfo/reportersguide.pdf [perma.cc/Q5BA-T6K8]. 
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B. WHY IS VARJABEDIAN IMPORTANT? FINANCIAL STAKES AND DE FACTO 
NEGLIGENCE STANDARD 
 
The Ninth Circuit’s adoption of a negligence standard for claims 
under § 14(e) of the Exchange Act will encourage stockholder 
plaintiffs to continue filing frivolous “merger objection” cases in 
district courts within the Ninth Circuit to circumvent [the scienter 
requirement] and capitalize on the Ninth Circuit’s lenient 
negligence standard.  This, coupled with the Exchange Act’s 
liberal jurisdiction provision, encourages forum-shopping, and 
risks creating a de facto [national] negligence standard for all § 
14(e) cases.14 
 
Why is the Ninth Circuit’s Varjabedian holding important? The answer 
is that securities class action plaintiffs will have accomplished quite a coup 
if they can lower the standard of proof for Section 14(e) liability.15  The 
increase of federal court lawsuits by investors challenging M&A 
transactions is “[t]he single biggest development in securities class action 
litigation in the past two years” (i.e., 2016-17).16 
Merger objection lawsuits are often verbatim versions of prior 
complaints with only the parties’ names changed, typically filed within 
days of the merger announcement.17  This problem has grown so routine 
that businesses view merger objection suits simply as a transaction or 
merger tax on the tender offer.18  The Legal Reform Institute outlined the 
plaintiffs’ bar strategy clearly, describing the abusive practice as follows: 
 
Here’s how it works: Just about every merger or acquisition that 
involves a public company and is valued over $100 million¾91% 
of all such transactions in 2010 and 2011¾becomes the subject of 
multiple lawsuits within weeks [or in Varjabedian’s case, within 
twenty-four hours] of its announcement.  Because the parties to the 
merger want to close their deal and begin to reap the economic 
benefits of the combination, the vast majority of these lawsuits 
settle quickly¾within three months¾and typically provide little or 
 
 14. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1 at 13–14. 
 15. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1, 
24 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459. 
 16. Alison Frankel, Bucking precedent, 9th Circuit Opens Door to More M&A Challenges, 
REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-securities/bucking-precedent-
9th-circuit-opens-door-to-more-ma-challenges-idUSKBN1HU2NH [perma.cc/U8CX-QL6L]. 
 17. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1, at 7. 
 18. Id. at 9. 
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no benefit for shareholders.  But the settlements do award large 
attorneys’ fees to the lawyers who filed the lawsuits.19 
 
In an effort to avoid derailing multi-million-dollar acquisition efforts, 
firms who fear their deals’ death after being tied up in lengthy, often 
frivolous, litigation20 will frequently settle merger objection cases.21 
In Varjabedian, the plaintiffs (Emulex shareholders) alleged that the 
target-defendant, Emulex, and other defendants omitted material 
information about the offered purchase price per share when Emulex issued 
its Recommendation Statement urging its shareholders to accept the 
$8.00/share offer to purchase.22  In an attempt to avoid a costly discovery 
dispute, Emulex then provided shareholders with the core documents, 
including the so-called ‘Board Book’ that Goldman Sachs had complied.23 
While facilitating additional disclosure may appear to be beneficial to 
shareholders, in practice, however, class action plaintiffs have practically 
forced corporations to facilitate a practice of over-disclosure.24  Over-
disclosure results in corporations burying shareholders in an avalanche of 
trivial information in order to mitigate risk and avoid liability.25  It is 
important to note that disclosure documents frequently are already 
“hundreds of pages long.”26 
From a market efficiency perspective, this over-disclosure leads to 
negative outcomes, like companies wasting resources by disclosing 
immaterial information, and then investors waste their time, money, and 
effort attempting to distill the material from the immaterial in disclosure.27  
Put simply, and as demonstrated in the quote below, over-disclosure rarely 
culminates a net positive outcome from an economic efficiency 
perspective, nor is the practice conducive to informed decision-making.28 
 
The federal securities laws not only are key to the efficient 
functioning of markets, but also are prone to litigation abuses, as 
Congress itself recognized in the PSLRA . . .  If allowed to stand, 
 
 19. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 1, 
18, Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp. (9th Cir. 2018), No. 18-459 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Brief 
for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America]. 
 20. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1, at 10. 
 21. Id. at 9. 
 22. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1, 
8 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459. 
 23. Id. at 7. 
 24. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1, at 16–17. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 17. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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the Ninth Circuit’s decision [in Varjabedian] will fundamentally 
alter the civil liability regime that courts have applied under 
Section 14(e) for half a century and create the very litigation 
abuses that Congress has sought to prevent in order to protect 
businesses and markets.29 
 
Prior to 2016, the plaintiffs’ bar exploited this opportunity fully in state 
court, as the number of such cases quadrupled from 2005 to 2010.30  The 
vast majority of these cases were filed in state court, most frequently in 
Delaware, with approximately sixty percent of merger objection suits filed 
in Delaware.31  However, in 2017, the number of M&A deals litigated in 
federal court increased 20 percent, while state court filings declined.32  The 
shift in forum is no coincidence.33 
Both the decline of Delaware state court filings and the migration to 
federal courts directly coincide with the time frame in which the Delaware 
Chancery Court, in its 2016 Trulia decision,34 held that it would no longer 
approve disclosure-only settlements except in “unusual circumstances.”35  
Put simply, attorneys who obtained only additional proxy disclosures as 
contrasted with money damages, would no longer be entitled to obtain 
large fees for little work, so filings quickly shifted out of Delaware and into 
federal court.36 
 
The primary reason for the Delaware courts’ skepticism was that 
the supplemental disclosures in many cases addressed immaterial 
details that did not aid stockholders in deciding whether to 
approve a transaction.37 
 
The Delaware Chancery Court, in essence, saw a need for immediate 
reform, acknowledging that the plaintiffs’ bar had “created a real systemic 
 
 29. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1, 
22-23 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459. 
 30. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, supra note 19, at 18. 
 31. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1, at 4, 12.  
 32. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, supra note 19, at 18 
(emphasis added). 
 33. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1, at 4. 
 34. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, supra note 19, at 19. 
 35. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1, at 11. 
 36. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association as Amicus Curiae at 1, 9, 
Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp. (9th Cir. 2018), No. 18-459 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Brief for 
the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association]; Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States of America, supra note 19, at 19. 
 37. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association as Amicus Curiae at 1, 10, 
Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d (9th Cir. 2018) cert. granted (U.S. Jan. 4, 2019) (No. 18-459).  
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problem.”38  Further, a Delaware Chancery Court Judge stated that “it just 
can’t be that there are meaningful disclosure violations in every single 
M&A case that’s being filed in this court.”39 
The Trulia decision had an immediate impact, forcing class action 
plaintiffs to switch tactics in the ‘merger objection’ litigation.40  For 
example, in 2014, federal courts had forty merger objection lawsuits.41  In 
2015, that number increased to forty-four merger objections.42  However, 
following the Trulia decision, the number of merger objections more than 
doubled in 2017, reaching 197 merger objection suits filed.43  It is critical 
to note that the federal filings increase corresponds to a decrease in merger 
objection lawsuits filed in Delaware.44  Now that the class action plaintiffs’ 
strategy turns to using the federal courts for merger objection lawsuits, the 
following risks are created: 
 
The Ninth Circuit’s mere negligence requirement will now 
circumvent Trulia and capitalize on the Ninth Circuit’s lenient 
negligence standard.  This, coupled with the [1934] Exchange 
Act’s liberal jurisdiction provision, encourages forum-shopping, 
and risks creating a de facto negligence standard for all § 14(e) 
cases.45 
 
Essentially, the inconsistent application of Section 14(e) merger 
objection standards will result in a de facto nationwide negligence standard 
because plaintiffs’ lawyers would logically avoid bringing claims in the 
more stringent, scienter standard jurisdiction.46  One only has to look at the 
Ninth Circuit filings to see that this de facto nationwide standard will 
almost certainly affect all future tender offers unless Varjabedian is 
reversed.47 
The Ninth Circuit has replaced the Delaware Chancery Court as the 
preferred forum for merger objection suits.48  Varjabedian has only further 
bolstered the view that the Ninth Circuit is plaintiff-friendly in the merger 
objection context.49  This determination is strongly supported by the filing 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 11. 
 41. Id. at 12. 
 42. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1 at 12. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 14. 
 46. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1 at 18.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 14. 
 49. Frankel, supra note 16. 
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numbers.50  From 2012 to 2014, only two merger objection suits were filed 
in the Ninth Circuit, with eight filings in 2015.51  That number jumped to 
twenty-five in 2016 and forty-one in 2017.52  Merger objection litigation is 
only projected to grow in 2018, as twenty-two merger objection suits have 
been filed in the Ninth Circuit during the first half of the year.53 
By reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Varjabedian, the Supreme 
Court has an opportunity to avoid both perpetuating market inefficiencies 
resulting from merger objection suits as well as preventing plaintiffs from 
forum shopping and capitalizing on the de facto nationwide negligence 
standard.54 
 
C.  OVERVIEW OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S LEGAL ANALYSIS IN VARJABEDIAN 
 
This section walks through the Ninth Circuit’s jurisprudence to 
establish a framework to discuss the Court’s deviation in reasoning in 
Varjabedian.  The Varjabedian Court stated the following: “[W]e now hold 
that Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act requires a showing of negligence, 
not scienter.”55 
 
[W]e are aware that our holding today parts ways from our 
colleagues in five other circuits . . .  However, . . . we are 
persuaded that intervening guidance from the Supreme Court [i.e., 
re-analysis of opinions in Aaron (1980) and Ernst & Ernst (1976)] 
. . . compels the conclusion that Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act 
imposes a negligence standard.56 
 
The first analytical test, and by far, the most focused upon throughout 
the opinion by the Ninth Circuit was the plain meaning of the statute.57  
The precise wording of Section 14(e) provides: 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of 
a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order 
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any 
 
 50. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1, at 14. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 14–15. 
 54. Id. at 15. 
 55. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d at 401. 
 56. Id. at 409–10. 
 57. Id. at 404. 
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fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in 
connection with any tender offer.58 
 
According to the Varjabedian Court, the use of the word “or” between 
the two clauses is critical because such usage shows that there are two 
different offenses proscribed by the statute; to construe the statute 
otherwise would render it “hopelessly redundant” and declare one of the 
clauses surplusage.59  Therefore, the court held ultimately, because the text 
of the first clause of Section 14(e) does not suggest scienter is required, the 
first clause of Section 14(e) only requires a showing negligence, not 
scienter.60  The Ninth Circuit did review the leading cases in the other five 
circuits that require a pleading of scienter for a Section 14(e) claim; 
however, the opinion diplomatically suggests the statute has not heretofore 
been read correctly in those other circuits.61 
Beginning with the Second Circuit’s Chris-Craft decision in 1973 
(“Chris-Craft”) and up through the Fifth Circuit’s Flaherty decision in 
2009, five circuits have held that to state a claim under Section 14(e), one 
must allege that the defendant acted with scienter.62  For example, the 
Supreme Court held that a Rule 10b-5 violation requires scienter in Ernst & 
Ernst in 1976.63  However, in Varjabedian, the Ninth Circuit held the better 
analogy is between the first part of Section 14(e) and the “nearly identical 
text” of Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.64 Further, “that is 
significant because back in 1980, the Supreme Court held in Aaron Section 
17(a)(2) does not require a showing of scienter.”65  Stated alternatively: 
 
The net effect of Varjabedian is to make it easier for plaintiffs to 
challenge tender offer disclosures.  Already plaintiffs were using 
14(d)(4) in an attempt to avoid having to plead scienter, but that 
was an uncertain work-around, as many district courts had held 
that 14(d)(4) does not provide a private right of action.  From a 
plaintiff’s point of view, having a negligence claim under 14(e) 
 
 58. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 59. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d at 404. 
 60. Id. at 408. 
 61. Id. at 409–10. 
 62. Bruce A. Ericson et al., Ninth Circuit: Enough to Allege Negligence When Attacking Tender 
Offer Documents, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.pillsbury 
law.com/en/news-and-insights/enough-to-allege-negligence-when-attacking-tender-offer-documents. 
html [perma.cc/3JPC-B9SS]. 
 63. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d at 410. 
 64. Ericson, supra note 62.  
 65. Id.  
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[courtesy of Varjabedian] is more than an even trade for losing the 
opportunity to claim under 14(d)(4).66 
 
The Roberts Court has, on average, selected approximately two 
securities law cases per term.67  Further, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
demonstrated a willingness to grant certiorari in securities cases and 
recently entered decisions either clarifying or limiting the scope of 
securities class actions.68  The abovementioned factors all support the 
Supreme Court’s granting of Emulex’s petition for certiorari on January 4, 
2019.69  Accordingly, the Supreme Court should reverse the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Varjabedian.70 
The balance of this Article is as follows: Part II, the background of 
Varjabedian, including basic facts and procedural steps in detail; Part III, 
the legislative history of The Williams Act concerning tender offers, which 
includes Section 14(e); Part IV, a review of the most significant case law 
considered by the Ninth Circuit panel; Part V, an analysis of the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Varjabedian; Part VI, a conclusion; and Part VII, an 




The Varjabedian dispute arose in February 2015 when two technology 
firms, Emulex and Avago Technologies Wireless Manufacturing, Inc., 
sought to combine using a tender offer as the technique.71  Emulex 
manufactured data center equipment (e.g., routers and network interface 
cards) and Avago developed semiconductors.72  Avago, the prospective 
acquiror would acquire the target, Emulex, via an Avago subsidiary, 
Emerald Merger Sub. Inc.73 
The merger was jointly announced on February 25, 2015, and would be 
executed via an accepted tender offer.74  The tender offer occurred on April 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Aaron F. Miner et al., Supreme Court Has Opportunity to Reexamine Implied Private Right of 
Action Under Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, Arnold & Porter (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.arnold 
porter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/10/scotus-has-opportunity-to-reexamine [perma.cc/U92Z-
Y84M]. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Barnes, supra note 8. 
 70. Miner, supra note 67. 
 71. Ericson, supra note 62. 
 72. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1, 
6 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459. 
 73. Ericson, supra note 62.   
 74. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1, 
6 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459. 
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7, 2015.75  Avago’s cash tender offer price of $8.00 for all outstanding 
shares was a 26.4% premium over the pre-announcement share price (i.e., 
the market share price on the day before the merger was jointly 
announced).76  Later that day, Emulex filed its SEC Recommendation 
Statement, which included a total of nine reasons why the share price 
tendered should be accepted by its shareholders, including that Emulex 
shareholders would receive a premium on their stock.77 
The next day on April 8, 2015, Emulex shareholder Gary Varjabedian, 
sued, filing a putative federal class action in U.S. District Court for the 
Central District of California.78  Varjabedian asserted 1934 Act claims 
under Sections 14(e), 14(d)(4), and 20(a).79  In an effort to avoid a costly 
discovery dispute, the target, Emulex, voluntarily provided Varjabedian 
with core documents, including the so-called ‘Board Book’ that Goldman 
Sachs had complied.80 
However, the Board Book’s final page contained a graphic chart titled 
“Selected Semiconductor Transactions,” (also referred to as the ‘Premium 
Analysis’) which listed, based on publicly available information, the 
premiums received in 17 transactions involving semiconductor companies 
between 2010-2014.81  The chart did not provide any additional financial 
analysis or further comparison apart from showing that Avago’s tender 
offer consisting of a 26.4% share premium, while below average, fell 
within the range of comparable transaction premiums.82 
Varjabedian then amended his class action complaint seeking damages 
and an order rescinding the merger transaction.83  Despite this, Avago’s 
tender offer was close (i.e., only 60.58% of outstanding shares were 
tendered),84 but ultimately successful and the merger between Avago and 
Emulex was executed.85  In his amended complaint, Varjabedian claimed 
the failure to include the single page Premium Analysis created the 
materially misleading impression that the premium Emulex’s shareholders 
 
 75. Id. at 402. 
 76. Id. at 401. 
 77. Id. at 402. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Ericson, supra note 62. 
 80. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1, 
7 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459. 
 81. Id. at 402. 
 82. Id. at 402–03. 
 83. Id. at 409–10.  
 84. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), brief for the respondents 
in opposition filed, 1, 4 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2018) No. 18-459. 
 85. John P. Stigi III & John M. Landry, Ninth Circuit Splits From Other Circuits, Holding That a 
Negligence Standard Applies to a Claim Challenging Tender Offer Disclosures Under Section 14(e), 
THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ninth-circuit-spli 
ts-other-circuits-holding-negligence-standard-applies-to-claim [https://perma.cc/XQ6M-ETZ9]. 
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received was significant, or at the least in line with premiums obtained in 
similar transactions, as the tender offer was below market average.86  
Varjabedian stated the following when describing the basis for the 
amended complaint: 
 
[T]he [Premium Analysis] did not cover one specific page from the 
banker’s slide deck: a chart comparing the merger premium to that 
of selected semiconductor transactions and showing that the 
premium on this deal (allegedly 26.4 percent), while within the 
range, was below the average (allegedly 50.8 percent).87 
 
Emulex successfully argued for dismissal of the amended complaint, 
arguing that the omitted information was publicly available and immaterial, 
and that the plaintiff [was] required to plead scienter but had not.88  The 
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California ultimately 
dismissed Varjabedian’s amended complaint on the grounds that the 
plaintiff’s 14(e) claim required pleading scienter and that a mere 
negligence standard was insufficient.89  In the district court’s reasoning, the 
court stated the following: 
 
‘[N]o federal court has held that §14(e) requires only a showing of 
negligence,’ and ‘the better view is that the similarities between 
Rule 10b-5 and §14(e) require a plaintiff bringing a cause of action 
under §14(e) to allege scienter,’ i.e., that [the] ‘defendants made 
false or misleading statements either intentionally or with 
deliberate recklessness.’90 
 
Further, the district court held that the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (“PSLRA”) unequivocally heightened pleading requirements 
by requiring pleading facts evincing a strong inference of scienter.91  The 
district court also dismissed the 14(d)(4) claim, stating that 14(d)(4) does 
not allow for a private right of action.92 
 
 86. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1, 
8 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459. 
 87.  Ericson, supra note 62. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1, 
9 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459. 
 90. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1, 
9 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Ericson, supra note 62. 
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The key reasons for the district court’s holding are as follows: firstly, 
nothing in the Premium Analysis contradicted the Recommendation 
Statement; indeed, the chart simply reported that the Emulex premium was 
below average for the industry but within a reasonable range of outcomes.93  
Second, the tender offer price was also below average for the 
semiconductor industry but still within a reasonable range.94  Moreover, the 
district court stated the exclusion of the Premium Analysis was minor in 
the entire scheme of the voluminous Goldman Sachs analysis,95 finding 
there was a better explanation than fraud for defendants’ decision not to 
include the chart.96  Finally, the district court held the plaintiff’s 
allegations, even if accepted as true, failed to establish a “strong inference 
of scienter,” which was required for proving Section 14(e) and proceeded 
to dismiss Varjabedian’s amended complaint.97 
Varjabedian then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.98  
The Ninth Circuit panel, consisting of Judges Graber, Murguia, and 
Christen, affirmed the district court’s decision that Section 14(d)(4) does 
not establish a private right of action.99  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit 
Panel focused primarily on whether Section 14(e) requires a showing of 
scienter or mere negligence.100 
On April 20, 2018, the Ninth Circuit issued a published opinion 
affirming the district court’s 14(d)(4) ruling, but reversing the district 
court’s Section 14(e) scienter holding and stating that Section 14(e) 
requires a showing of only negligence, not scienter.101 
The Ninth Circuit noted that it chose to part ways from its colleagues in 
five other circuits.102  Thereby, the Ninth Circuit currently, contradicts the 
Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits’ rationales and 
interpretations,103 and finds the other circuits erred in focusing on the 
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shared text found in both Rule 10b-5 and Section 14(e).104  The shared text 
between the two provisions is as follows: 
 
[It is] unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of 
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they are made, not misleading.105 
 
Instead, the Ninth Circuit explained that its holding that Section 14(e) 
requires negligence rather than scienter is supported by the Williams Act, 
relevant provisions of which will be discussed in the analysis section, see 
infra.106  The court found that Section 14(e) places more emphasis on the 
quality of the information shareholders receive in a tender offer than on the 
state of mind harbored by those issuing a tender offer.107  The Ninth 
Circuit’s reliance on a pure textual analysis108 was further justified by the 
court’s view that two United States Supreme Court cases had undermined 
the shared text argument.109 
The first case, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, held Rule 10b-5 requires a 
showing of scienter not because it uses language suggestive of intentional 
wrongdoing, but because of its authorizing legislation, Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 78j(b), which permits the SEC to regulate 
only scienter-based conduct.110  On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit 
reasoned this rationale regarding Rule 10b-5 did not apply to Section 14(e), 
as it is a statute, not an SEC Rule.111 
The Ninth Circuit, also relied upon Aaron v. Securities & Exchange 
Comm’n to support its holding.112  The Supreme Court analyzed Section 
17(a)(2)of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2), as a statute 
with nearly identical wording to Section 14(e)’s first clause, which did not 
require a scienter.113  Thus, the Ninth Circuit held Section 14(e) only 
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requires showing negligence.114  The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to 
the district court to review Emulex’s motion to dismiss under a negligence, 
instead of a scienter standard.115 
 
III.  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WILLIAMS ACT 
 
Prior to 1968, the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”) and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) left a regulatory loophole.116  
Unlike many countries, which analyze the merit of a transaction, the United 
States relies principally on a disclosure-based regime for regulating 
securities transactions.117  United States policy prioritizes providing quality, 
accurate information essential for at least two interrelated reasons: investor 
protection and the health of capital markets.118  Hofstra Professor of Law, 
Ronald Colombo, indicates that one only needs to relive the 2008-2009 
global financial crisis to highlight the importance of accurate information 
and pricing.119 
Thus, the critical nature of information disclosure in the corporate 
combination setting requires information and pricing disclosures under 
both the 1933 Act (e.g., in a stock-for-stock exchange)120 and the 1934 Act 
(e.g., under a more conventional statutory merger route).121  Despite 
reporting requirements being in place, both the 1933 and the 1934 Acts still 
failed to cover all efforts at seizing corporate control.122  This regulatory 
gap123 became particularly apparent during the 1960’s when the United 
States securities markets witnessed a wave of unannounced takeovers 
carried out by corporate raiders, and which created a threat to managers and 
shareholders, who were forced to make critical decisions under 
unreasonable time pressure.124 
A primary mechanism used by corporate raiders for executing these 
unannounced takeovers were known as tender offers, which are publicly 
announced offers to purchase the shares of a target company—as a means 
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of effecting corporate combinations.125  Tender offers were unregulated, 
“unlike conventional means of effecting takeovers such as mergers, 
exchange offers, and proxy contests.”126  In its infancy, the tender offer was 
primarily used for uncontested situations where the offeror and the target 
were on friendly terms.127 
Using a tender offer in an uncontested setting was viewed as favorable 
because it reduced fees and expenses of the corporate combination when 
compared with a traditional statutory merger.128  Additionally, uncontested 
tender offers were employed by an issuer attempting to repurchase its own 
shares.129  Tender offers continued to be primarily used in these types of 
uncontested settings through the early 1960s, however, their usage quickly 
evolved.130 
In essence, the loopholes gained practical significance in the 1960s, 
when the cash tender offer became a favored method of acquiring control 
of publicly held corporations.131  To highlight both the scope and scale of 
this evolution, only eight tender offers were initiated in 1960, but more 
than 100 tender offers were initiated in 1966.132  Further, tender offers 
began to be employed throughout a variety of settings, for example, to 
obtain control of a corporation that is adverse to being taken over, to 
acquire a company whose board of directors, although unopposed is not in 
favor of sponsoring the acquisition, to gain control of a corporation before 
a competing bid is perfected by a third party, and to save a company in 
danger where a timely merger could not be made.133 
This substantial increase in tender offers was due to several key 
advantages over traditional takeover methods: (1) speed and efficiency, (2) 
cheaper and reduced risk of unsuccessful takeover efforts, and (3) its 
“secrecy and surprise” capabilities.134  The third key advantage is that the 
target company is left virtually powerless to convince shareholders not to 
sell their shares for above-market prices when the offeror’s identity is 
concealed.135 
The third key benefit was the most significant as it allowed the buyer to 
accumulate large amounts of an issuer’s shares and to extend cash tender 
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offers, all in complete secrecy.136  Tender offers also typically comprised a 
timing element that forced shareholders to operate on a compressed 
timetable.137  Shareholders had minimal information about the offeror, and 
were often required to make hurried decisions while lacking key 
information which Congress always intended to be disclosed to 
investors.138  While there were some defensive strategies to defend against 
hostile takeovers (e.g., poison pills and Pac-Man defenses),139 many legal 
scholars accepted the basic claim that most defensive tactics are overall 
undesirable.140  Coupled with the continued lack of regulatory oversight, a 
“war-like” takeover culture emerged, ultimately prompting Congressional 
action by the late 1960s.141 
In 1965, New Jersey Senator Harrison Williams led drafting reform 
efforts to end the war-like takeover culture and began the fight to close the 
loopholes.142  In doing so, Senator Williams’ draft legislation stated that:  
 
[A]ny substantial accumulation of shares of a company registered 
under the [1934 Securities Exchange] Act must be preceded by the 
filing of public information . . . as this was the only way that 
corporations, their stockholders, and employees [can] adequately 
prepare in advance to meet the threat of the takeover specialist.143 
 
Congress enacted Senator Williams’ legislation in 1968, known as the 
Williams Act.144  The Williams Act amended the 1934 Act and introduced 
Sections 13(d), 13(e), 14(d), 14(e) and 14(f) to the 1934 Act. Essentially, 
Congress amended the 1934 Act by adopting the tender offer and takeover 
provisions of the Williams Act.145 
The Williams Act exclusively deals with transactions deemed to be a 
tender offer, a term which is not defined in the Act itself.146  A variety of 
tests have been put forth (e.g., the SEC’s eight-factor test) to determine 
whether or not an offer qualifies as a tender offer.147  In Varjabedian, both 
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parties are in accord that the dispute involves a tender offer and is subject 
to the Williams Act.148  The Williams act is subject to one exception stated 
as follows: 
 
The [Williams Act] exception is that anyone who acquires over 
five percent of any class of equity securities of a company subject 
to the Act is required to file a disclosure statement with the SEC 
and the target regardless of whether the acquisition is by way of 
tender offer or otherwise.149 
 
Legislative history indicates that Congress intended the Williams Act 
to be neutral, and not to tip the balance of regulation in favor of the target 
corporation or the offeror.150  Further, the legislative history highlights a 
primary Congressional goal, largely due to Senator Williams’ intent, to 
close regulatory loopholes by requiring the disclosure of pertinent 
information to stockholders when a corporation undergoes a potential 
acquisition by a cash tender offer or through open market or privately 
negotiated purchases of securities.151 
For the purposes of this Article, this author will provide a brief 
overview of the amended sections and then provide detailed analysis 
relating to section 14(e) as it is directly relevant to Varjabedian. In contrast 
to other provisions of the Williams Act, 1934 Act Section 14(e) applies to 
any tender offer using an instrumentality of interstate commerce, even if 
the target company is not subject to the Exchange Act’s registration and 
reporting requirements.152  
Section 13(d) relates to the appropriate form for 1934 Act filings 
regarding disclosure requirements about the firm, its officers, directors, and 
principal business, as well as any financing arrangements that have been 
entered into to finance the purchase.153  Section 13(e) of the 1934 Act 
makes it unlawful for issuers, subject to the 1934 Exchange Act’s 
registration requirements, to purchase their own shares in contravention of 
SEC rules.154  Section 14(d) requires any person planning a ‘tender offer’ 
for any class of equity security subject to the Exchange Act’s registration 
and reporting requirements file with the Commission all solicitations, 
advertisements, or other material used in connection with the tender 
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offer.155  Section 14(e) contains an anti-fraud provision, which the author 
will examine in detail, see infra.156  Section 14(f) addresses public 






IV.  MOST SIGNIFICANT CASE LAW: DETERMINING 
WHETHER SECTION 14(E) REQUIRES A PLEADING OF 
SCIENTER OR MERE NEGLIGENCE 
 
Prior to examining the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the district court’s 
14(e) holding, it is necessary to understand the significant tender offer case 
law and its historical development leading up to Varjabedian. 
 
A. CASE SUMMARIES 
 
i. Chris-Craft Industries v. Piper Aircraft Corporation (“Chris-Craft”) – Second 
Circuit (1973) 
 
The Second Circuit laid the groundwork for defining the scope, as well 
as the principles to apply when analyzing Section 14(e), in Chris-Craft 
Industries v. Piper Aircraft Corporation (“Chris-Craft”).158  In 1968 to 
1969, both Chris-Craft Industries (“CCI”) and Bangor Punta Corporation 
(“BPC”) initiated financing efforts in an attempt to each individually 
acquire Piper Aircraft Corporation, which culminated in instant 
litigation.159 
In Chris-Craft, CCI’s and BPC’s tender offers led CCI and BPC to 
own forty-one percent and forty-five percent, respectively, of the 
outstanding Piper Shares.160  CCI eventually withdrew from the power 
struggle leaving BPC to purchase 100,614 shares in order to gain majority 
control of Piper Aircraft.161  CCI’s unsuccessful tender offer attempt cost 
the firm more than $44 million.162 
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CCI then initiated suit, claiming, inter alia, each defendant violated 
Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, due to a joint Piper-
BPC press release which stated that BPC was acquiring the Piper family’s 
stock holdings through a tender exchange offer for a package of BPC 
securities.  The release contained a statement that BPC would offer to the 
remaining Piper shareholders a package of BPC securities valued in the 
judgment of First Boston “at not less than $80 per Piper share,” which was 
later reported by the President of BPC, David W. Wallace, to a Wall Street 
Journal reporter.163  However, some BPC’s purchases, were conducted 
ultimately for less than $80.00, made during the pendency of an exchange 
offer for the purchased shares, further driving up the share price.164 
The Second Circuit ultimately held that 14(e) was violated.165  In doing 
so, the Second Circuit reviewed Section 14(e)’s accompanying Senate 
Report, stating the Report indicated clearly and more specifically than Rule 
10b-5 that Section 14(e) was intended to apply the long established 
antifraud proscriptions of the federal securities laws to a tender offer.166 
When reviewing the district court’s analysis, the Second Circuit held 
the various communications to Piper shareholders, including the press 
release by Piper and BPC did not violate 14(e).167  However, the Second 
Circuit, in reversing the lower court’s Section 14(e) holding acknowledged 
Section 14(e) was relatively new, and therefore had not been the subject of 
extensive judicial construction, and never in the context of the factual 
situation here presented.168 
However, the Second Circuit has held that the underlying proscription 
of Section 14(e) was virtually identical to Rule 10b-5; with the critical 
difference of the latter applicable only in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security, while the former is applicable in connection with any 
tender offer.169 
Accordingly, the Chris-Craft court held Section 14(e) requires scienter 
via the principles developed under Rule 10b-5.170  In short, the Second 
Circuit held a violation of Section 14(e) requires a material misstatement or 
omission concerned with a tender offer, and that such misstatement or 
omission was sufficiently culpable to justify granting relief to the injured 
party.171 
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ii. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co. – Fifth Circuit (1974) 
 
In the Fifth Circuit, Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co. (“Smallwood”), 
the court found a scienter requirement for a 14(e) violation and further 
raised multiple questions under the 1934 Act.172 
The plaintiff-appellant, Joe L. Smallwood, brought several claims 
following a tender offer, including claims under the Williams Act.173  The 
dispute arose in 1968 when Pearl Brewing, Defendant-Appellee, began to 
look for a suitable merger partner to diversify its product portfolio.174  
Eventually three merger candidates were identified, and Pearl Brewing 
ultimately selected a company called Zapata.175 
However, during the tender offer process, Pearl’s Board failed to 
inform Pearl shareholders the merger with Zapata could be consummated 
without an underwriting commitment and without the ten-day period in 
which to tender their shares.176  Pearl shareholders filed suit alleging the 
defendants omitted material facts; and these failures constituted fraud or 
deceit upon the Pearl shareholders.177 
Ultimately, the jury in the district court found that Pearl’s failure to 
inform constituted material omissions.178 On appeal, the issue was whether 
the district court erred by not ruling that the defendants violated Section 
14(e) and Rule 10b-5.179  The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court citing 
Chris-Craft and further aligning with the Second Circuit’s elemental 
analysis.180  In doing so, the Fifth Circuit stated if Section 14(e) and Rule 
10b-5’s analyses are identical the scienter standard applies, and liability in 
a private action for damages has apparently never been imposed for 
negligent conduct under Rule 10b-5.181 
 
iii. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder – Supreme Court (1976) 
 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder (“Ernst & Ernst”) addresses whether an 
action for civil damages may lie under 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-
5 in the absence of an allegation of intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
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defraud on the part of the defendant.182  In this case, First Securities hired 
Ernst & Ernst, an accounting firm, to audit documents in connection with 
SEC filings (e.g., 10-K reports).183  Ernst and Ernst was an opportunity for 
the Supreme Court to directly address whether Rule 10b-5 could include 
both a negligence and a scienter standard.184 
The respondents, Olga Hochfelder, et. al. (“Hochfelder”), invested in a 
fraudulent securities scheme where the president of the firm and owner of 
ninety-two percent of its stock induced the respondents to invest in escrow 
accounts that the president claimed had a high return rate.185  However, in 
reality, it was discovered that there were no escrow accounts.186 
Hochfelder then sued claiming (1) the escrow scheme violated Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and (2) that Ernst & Ernst had aided and abetted the 
company’s violations by its failure to conduct proper audits of First 
Securities and as revealed through discovery, the respondents’ cause of 
action rested on a theory of negligence.187  The SEC argued that 
subsections (b) and (c) of Rule 10b-5 are worded such that, when standing 
alone, the subsections could encompass both intentional and negligent 
behavior.188 
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision that both 
intentional and negligent behavior could be encompassed within Rule 10b-
5 finding that such a reading could not be harmonized with the 
administrative history of Rule 10b-5.189  While the Supreme Court 
conceded that subsection (b)’s and subsection (c)’s language, could be read 
as proscribing, respectively, any type of material misstatement or omission, 
and any course of conduct, that has the effect of defrauding investors, 
whether the wrongdoing was intentional or not.190 
Further, the Supreme Court held such a reading of encompassing 
negligence cannot be harmonized with Rule 10b-5’s administrative history, 
which made it clear Rule 10b-5 was intended to apply only to activities that 
involved scienter191  Put simply, when a statute speaks so specifically in 
terms of manipulation and deception, most will understand this 
terminology as intentional wrongdoing.192   
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst, largely due to a lack 
of expansive intent, was unwilling to extend the statute’s scope to negligent 
conduct.193 
 
iv. Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc. – Sixth Circuit (1980) 
 
In Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc. (“Adams”), the appellees 
brought a class action suit under the 1934 Act.194  Chadbourn, Inc., a North 
Carolina-based hosiery manufacturer, and Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., a 
Tennessee-based textile manufacturer, sought to merge.195  A class action 
lawsuit followed based on the Appellees arguing that an allegedly false 
proxy solicitation was used to get the shareholder approval necessary for 
Standard Knitting and Chadbourne, Inc. to merge.196  Standard’s 
management stated their recommendation to merge with Chadbourn, Inc., 
in the proxy statement.197 
The key issue in Adams was whether the failure to mention certain 
restrictions on the payment of dividends by the acquiring corporation, 
applied to preferred as well as common stock in the proxy statement, was a 
negligent error.198  In its analysis, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the 
congressional intent and Section 14(e)’s language, focusing on the 
Williams Act.199  The Sixth Circuit found the Williams Act’s language 
clearly demonstrates Congress envisioned scienter to be an element of 
14(e) analysis.200  The Sixth Circuit determined scienter was the correct 
standard given Congress’ use of ‘fraudulent,’ ‘deceptive,’ and 
‘manipulative’ and in light of the Ernst & Ernst holding, that 14(e) analysis 
requires a showing of scienter.201 Thus, in reversing the district court’s 
decision in Adams, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that scienter is 
the required mental state for Section 14(e), based on congressional intent.  
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v. Aaron v. Securities and Exchange Commission – Supreme Court (1980) 
 
A month following the Adams decision, the Supreme Court addressed 
the issue of whether the SEC is required to establish scienter as an element 
of a civil enforcement action to enjoin violations of Section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”) and Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act in 
Aaron v. SEC (“Aaron”).202  In Aaron, the petitioner, an employee 
manager, of a registered broker-dealer in New York made false statements 
regarding due diligence documents.203  Here, the manager made false 
statements relating to a company, Lawn-A-Mat, a lawn-care equipment 
franchisor and supplier.204  The false statements concerned files relating to 
Lawn-A-Mat’s deteriorating financial condition and revealed no plans for 
manufacturing a new car and tractor.205  Importantly, no corrective 
measures were taken to prevent the manager from making further false 
statements to clients.206 
The SEC then filed a complaint in the Southern District of New York 
against the petitioner for, inter alia, violating Section 17(a) of the 1933 
Act.207  The SEC alleged that the manager knew or had reason to know that 
the employees under his supervision engaged in fraudulent practices, but 
failed to take adequate steps to prevent those practices from continuing.208  
The relevant provisions of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act are as follows: 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any 
securities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation 
or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the 
mails, directly or indirectly . . . (2) to obtain money or property by 
means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading.209 
 
Citing Ernst & Ernst, the Aaron court held the language and history of 
Section 10(b) did not require a showing of scienter in an injunction 
enforcement action brought by the Commission under Section 17(a)(2).210  
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The majority in Aaron reasoned that the Ernst & Ernst decision was 
consistent with such a holding since it addressed a Commission 
enforcement action for injunctive relief and Ernst & Ernst was a private 
cause of action.211  Put simply, with regards to Section 10(b), the Supreme 
Court majority held scienter is a necessary element of a violation of Section 
10(b).212 
However, regarding whether scienter was required to prove a Section 
17(a)(2) claim, the Supreme Court relied largely on congressional intent, 
stating a negligence standard is sufficient to support an injunction.213  In 
support, the Court relied upon congressional intent, finding securities 
legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds should not be 
construed technically or restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial 
purposes.214  The Supreme Court held nothing on the face of 17(a)(2) 
necessitates a finding of both scienter or intent to defraud.215 
The majority also examined Sections 20(b) and 21(d) and determined 
that nothing on the face of either provision nor contrary legislative history 
imposed an independent requirement of scienter.216  Section 17(a)(1) 
requires scienter, but scienter is not required for a finding under Section 
17(a)(2) or 17(a)(3).217 
The concurring opinion instead held sound reasons are available to 
distinguish between private damages and public enforcement actions under 
these statutes, and therefore, apply a scienter standard for private damages 
actions.218  For example, the general tenor of state securities laws was cited 
as it pertains to equitable relief. Moreover, this notion was further 
reinforced via the Concurring Justices issuing a reminder that the Supreme 
Court was examining equity practice requirements, which consisted of 
several centuries of development.219 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent conceded the history, statutory structure, 
legislative purpose, and policy suggested injunctive relief did not require 
scienter per Section 17(a) and Section 10(b).220  Justice Blackmun further 
relied upon Congress’s prior approval of scienter’s use in both private 
damages and public enforcement actions to diminish the importance of a 
preliminary scienter finding.221  Put simply, scienter should apply for all 
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Section 17 provisions in a private right of action and a negligence standard 
may apply only for Section 17 SEC enforcement actions when the statue 
and relevant case law is interpreted in its respective context.222 
 
vi. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Fluor Corp. – Second Circuit (1987) 
 
The Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Fluor Corp. (“Connecticut Nat.”) arose 
out of Fluor Corp.’s tender offer for St. Joe’s Mineral Corporation.223  On 
May 4, 1981, the Plaintiff Appellants, Connecticut Nat. Bank (“CNB”), 
bought 39,000 St. Joe Shares from Hartford Steam Boiler Company.224  
However, that number of shares represented the number that Fluor, by 
virtue of the proration requirements of the Williams Act, would have 
purchased if CNB tendered the 50,000 shares before midnight on April 
15.225  When CNB later resold the shares following Flour’s expiration date, 
the firm suffered a net loss in excess of $550,000.226 
CNB then brought claims under Sections 14(d) and 14(e) of the 1934 
Act, alleging Fluor’s failure to print the oversubscription restriction in the 
same paragraph with, and in the same size print as, the May 1, 1981, 
expiration date of the tender offer, and its failure in other ways to 
emphasize that restriction, constituted misstatements and omissions of 
material facts in the description of the tender offer in violation of the 
Williams Act.227  Further, CNB stated shareholders were misled by the 
offer, alleging scienter stating the following: 
 
Fluor intended to mislead the Shareholders or their agents, 
commercial banks or custodians by the aforesaid misstatements 
and omissions, or knew or should have known that the 
misstatements and omissions would mislead and confuse the 
shareholders or their agents, commercial banks, or custodians and 
acted recklessly and wantonly in communicating the terms of the 
offer.228 
 
The district court dismissed this Williams Act claim since CNB’s 
allegations of scienter failed to comply with Rule 9(b) requirements.229  
The Second Circuit upholding the district court’s holding, further dismissed 
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278 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 15:2 
the above claim, emphasizing that scienter was a necessary element for a 
damages claim under Section 14(e).230  Moreover, the Second Circuit 
reiterated that the same principles for determining scienter under Rule 10b-
5 apply likewise to Section 14(e).231 
 
vii. In re Digital Island Securities Litigation – Third Circuit (2004) 
 
In re Digital Island Securities Litigation (“Digital Island”), former 
shareholders of Digital Island, Inc., an e-commerce provider as well as the 
acquired corporation here, brought a class action lawsuit against the 
company.232  Cable & Wireless PLC’s (“C & W”) acquired Digital Island, 
Inc., via a tender offer which resulted in C & W purchasing eighty percent 
of Digital Island’s outstanding shares.233  In May 2001, Digital Island 
announced that it entered into an agreement to provide certain business 
services to Microsoft, increasing Digital Islands’ share price from $2.00 to 
$3.69 per share.234 
Three days later, the Digital Island board unanimously voted to 
approve the merger and to recommend that shareholders accept the tender 
offer price of $3.40.235  However, Digital Island announced two significant 
business deals immediately following the tender offer’s expiration.236  The 
two business deals were with (1) Bloomberg LP and (2) Major League 
Baseball (“MLB”).237  Based on this announcement, and immediately 
following C & W’s tender offer, Digital Island, Inc., shareholders filed a 
class action suit under Section 14(e).238  The shareholders claimed that both 
“the Bloomberg and MLB deals had substantial value to Digital Island, 
and, if disclosed, would have substantially influenced the shareholders’ 
decision to tender their shares.”239 
In affirming the district court’s decision, the Third Circuit held, citing 
Ernst & Ernst, that Section 14(e) was modeled on the antifraud provisions 
of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 and therefore also 
required proof of scienter.240  The Third Circuit reasoned that courts 
historically have construed both Sections 14(e) and 10(b) consistently 
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because of the similarity in the language and scope of Section 14(e) and 
Rule 10b-5.241 
 
viii. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Ginsburg – Eleventh Circuit (2004) 
 
SEC v. Ginsburg (“Ginsburg”) arose from a suspect trading pattern that 
occurred.242  Family members made several trades following multiple 
phone calls from a principal relaying alleged tips related to a tender 
offer.243  The allegations alleged that Ginsburg told his brother, Mark 
Ginsburg, and his father, Jordan Ginsburg, material nonpublic information 
relating to two merging companies, EZ Communications, Inc., and Katz 
Media Group, and that Mark and Jordan had traded on EZ stock using that 
information.244 
The SEC brought a civil enforcement action against Ginsberg.245  In 
reversing the district court’s holding, the Eleventh Circuit held, pursuant to 
Aaron that to establish liability under Section 10(b) and Section 14(e) and 
accompanying Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3, the SEC must prove that Ginsburg 
acted with scienter.246 
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned the factors would be rendered 
meaningless if no injunction was entered where every factor weighed in 
favor of an injunction, as was the case in Ginsberg.247  Accordingly, the 
district court’s judgment was reversed and remanded with instructions to 
enjoin Scott Ginsburg from future violations of the securities laws.248 
 
ix. Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU Corp. – Fifth Circuit 
(2009) 
 
Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU Corp. 
(“Flaherty”) arose out of a class action by convertible securities holders 
responding to a tender offer.249  The corporation, TXU, and its CEO, Stan 
Haiduk (“Haiduk”), allegedly were aware of an imminent dividend increase 
at the time of share repurchase.250  The appellants alleged that TXU and 
Haiduk made material misrepresentations and omissions of fact in 
 
 241. Id. 
 242. S.E.C. v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 1297. 
 247. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d. at 1305. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU Corp., 565 F.3d 200, 200 (5th Cir. 
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connection with a self-tender offer to purchase certain convertible TXU 
securities by the tender offer in 2004.251  Also, the appellants brought fraud 
claims under Section 10(b) and 14(e) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5.252  
The claims were based on the premise that appellees fraudulently 
misrepresented the timing and magnitude of a planned stock repurchase 
program and dividend increase to induce participation in the tender offer.253  
The district court dismissed the above claims, requiring a showing of 
scienter and not mere negligence.254 
The Fifth Circuit, affirmed the district court’s scienter requirement, and 
held plaintiffs must allege a misstatement or an omission of a material fact 
made with scienter on which the plaintiffs relied that proximately caused 
the plaintiff’s injury.255  Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit, citing Smallwood, 
found scienter is required for Section 14(e) claims because of the identical 
elemental nature of Rule 10b-5 and Section 14(e).256 
 
x. In re Tangoe, Inc. Stockholders Litigation – D.C. Conn. (2018) 
 
In 2018, shareholders filed a consolidated class action against Tangoe, 
a global telecom and expense management corporation, and its Board of 
Directors in the District Court for the District of Connecticut alleging 1934 
Act violations following a tender offer.257  The class action shareholders 
alleged that Tangoe and its Board intentionally made misstatements and 
omitted material information from the Recommendation Statement to 
induce stockholders to participate in the tender offer for their own personal 
gain.258 
The district court found the claimants failed to state a claim for 
violation of the statute making it unlawful to engage in any fraudulent, 
deceptive or manipulative practice in connection with the tender offer.259  
In so holding, the district court examined Section 14(e)’s requirements: 
 
(1) [D]efendant misrepresented or omitted … material facts in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (2) the 
shareholders relied to their detriment upon the misrepresentations 
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or omissions; and (3) the misrepresentations or omissions were 
made with scienter.260 
 
Thus, in In re Tangoe, Inc. (“Tangoe.”) the plaintiffs did not satisfy the 
above scienter requirement.261  The district court, in citing Aaron, also 
acknowledged, as the Ninth Circuit did in Varjabedian, that Section 
17(a)(2) of the 1933 Act and the first clause of Section 14(e) contain near-
identical wording, but found that reasoning ultimately unpersuasive.262  In 
support of its position, the district court held: 
 
While the Ninth Circuit has abandoned the requirement of pleading 
scienter for claims under Section 14(e), neither the Supreme 
Court—since its decision in Aaron considered Section 17(a)(2) of 
the Securities Act, not Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act—nor the 
Second Circuit has abandoned scienter as an element of pleading a 
claim under Section 14(e), and this Court therefore will continue to 
apply the current law in this Circuit.263 
 
The Tangoe court further relied upon a previous case in its own district, 
Sodhi,264 which held scienter was an independently sufficient ground to 
grant a motion to dismiss.265  In addition, the Tangoe opinion reiterated the 
requirements to satisfy a Section 14(e) claim: (1) Defendants 
misrepresented or omitted to state material facts in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security; (2) the shareholders relied to their detriment 
upon the misrepresentations or omissions; and (3) the misrepresentations or 
omissions were made with scienter.266 
Accordingly, the district court held, even in light of the Ninth Circuit’s 
ruling in Varjabedian, a showing of scienter, not mere negligence, is 
required to successfully plead a Section 14(e) claim.267 
 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING IN 
VARJABEDIAN 
 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Varjabedian rests, for the scope of this 
Article, on three key premises: (1) Section 14(e)’s text is disjunctive and 
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renders two separate and distinct clauses; (2) under the isolated language of 
Section 14(e)’s first clause, as analyzed in Ernst & Ernst and Aaron, a 
pleading of negligence, not scienter, is sufficient under Section 14(e); and 
(3) Emulex’s concerns regarding the creation of a de facto negligence 
standard are unfounded.268  The Conclusion section of the Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion states the following: 
 
We are aware that our holding today parts ways from our 
colleagues in five other circuits. However, . . . we are persuaded 
that intervening guidance from the Supreme Court compels the 
conclusion that Section 14(e) of the [1934] Exchange Act imposes 
a negligence standard. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district 
court’s decision as to the Section 14(e) claim [emphasis in 
original].269 
 
Regarding the text of Section 14(e), the Ninth Circuit’s justification for 
its holding, closely aligns with the Appellant’s Appellate and Supreme 
Court briefs.270  The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on a plain reading of 
Section 14(e).271  In so doing, the Ninth Circuit states that a purely textual 
interpretation readily divides the Section 14(e) into two clauses, each 
proscribing different conduct.272  In Varjabedian, the court focused on the 
“or”: 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person [1] to make any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or [2] 
to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or 
practices, in connection with any tender offer.273 
 
The Varjabedian opinion finds Section 14(e) proscribes two different 
offenses.274  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit solely relies on the plain language 
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meaning to predominate the statutory interpretation analysis.275  Thus, the 
use of the word “or” separating the two clauses in Section 14(e) shows that 
there are two distinct offenses that the statute proscribes.276  To hold 
otherwise, according to the Ninth Circuit, would be an improper statutory 
interpretation.277 
Stated alternatively, a purely textual interpretation supposedly permits 
the Ninth Circuit to view the first clause of Section 14(e) in isolation.278  
Thus, removing the preliminary clause away from its appropriate Section 
14(e) context is supposedly appropriate statutory interpretation.279  Further, 
the Ninth Circuit then relates the preliminary clause to materially 
indistinguishable text from other contexts to hold that the first clause, not 
its second, only requires a pleading of negligence, not scienter.280 
On balance, the Ninth Circuit’s textual interpretation of Section 14(e) 
is flawed.281  While, statutory interpretation does begin with the plain 
language, it certainly does not end there.282  Context is a primary 
determinant of meaning.283  In addition, the Supreme Court has consistently 
stressed the importance of reading a statute holistically and avoiding 
construing statutory phrases in isolation.284 
In essence, statutory provisions are not hermetically sealed off from the 
rest of the same sentence.285  In Chris-Craft, the Supreme Court already 
stated that Section 14(e) is modeled on the antifraud provisions of Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.286  Accordingly, Section 14(e) is an antifraud 
prohibition, not a negligence prohibition.287 
A review of the legislative history is also necessary to place Section 
14(e) in its appropriate context.288  When constructing Section 14(e): 
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Congress used a number of words—‘fraudulent,’ ‘deceptive,’ and 
‘manipulative’—that undeniably ‘connote . . . intentional or willful 
conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors’—‘a type of 
conduct quite different from negligence.’289 
 
When conducting statutory interpretation, words are known by the 
company they keep.290  Thus, an examination of the legislative history is 
also critical to conduct a thorough textual interpretation.291  The language 
Congress selected for 14(e) cannot merely be read in isolation because 
words in the same sentence, as is the case with Section 14(e)’s 
construction, were intended to have the same connotation. This is 
particularly true, however, in Varjabedian, as ignoring those neighbors 
would give “unintended breadth” to the Acts of Congress.292 
The Respondents, claim a negligence standard applies because Section 
14(e)’s text is unambiguous, yet they later cut against their own proposition 
by stating that Section 14(e) does not expressly require any specific state of 
mind.293  Per Congress’ perspective, the scienter element is viewed as so 
critical in the securities law context that they added a special, heightened 
pleading standard for it in the PSLRA of 1985.294 
In conclusion of the first premise, the Ninth Circuit’s failure to 
properly read Section 14(e) in its proper context, does not justify the 
departure from the otherwise uniform precedent on this issue across the 
country for the half-century since enactment of Section 14(e).295 
The Ninth Circuit’s second premise is based on two decades-old 
Supreme Court decisions, lending particular focus on a 1976 decision 
where the Supreme Court did conclude Rule 10b-5 required scienter as the 
SEC has the authority to regulate manipulative or deceptive practices.296  In 
short, the Ninth Circuit does not lend appreciable weight to the SEC 
context versus a private right of action and, accordingly, misapplies Ernst 
& Ernst. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit then stated the rationale regarding 
Rule 10b-5 does not apply to Section 14(e), which is a statute, not an SEC 
Rule.297  The Ninth Circuit panel asserts Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities 
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Act of 1933—and the first clause of Section 14(e), contain nearly identical 
wording.298  Both sections prohibit any untrue statement of a material fact 
or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements not misleading.299 
The Ninth Circuit does, and quite compellingly so from a surface-level 
analysis, state that the first clause’s text is devoid of any suggestion of a 
scienter requirement.300  Section 17(a)(2) appears in the 1933 Act whereas 
Section 14(e) appears in the 1934 Act, citing their own circuit stating, 
“statues dealing with similar subjects should be interpreted 
harmoniously.”301  The Ninth Circuit’s argument is this similarity in 
wording, irrespective of context, supposedly supports the proposition that 
Section 14(e) only requires a mere negligence showing because Aaron held 
that Section 17(a)(2) does not require a showing of scienter.302 
The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on both Ernst & Ernst and Aaron is 
misplaced.303  Essentially, the source of the confusion stems from the Ninth 
Circuit believing that Ernst & Ernst was significant because of its 
statement that the text of Rule 10b-5—on which Section 14(e) was 
modeled—could be read as proscribing, respectively, “any type of material 
misstatement or omission . . . whether the wrongdoing was intentional or 
not.”304 
However, the Ernst & Ernst dicta pertaining to Rule 10b-5’s text, does 
not necessarily compel finding that any inferred right of action should 
necessarily extend to negligence.305  The Ninth Circuit further did not 
account for the fact that Section 14(e) must be read as a whole, and in light 
of its antifraud objective.306  The central holding in Ernst & Ernst was that 
both the legislative histories of the 1933 and 1934 Acts highlight the 
following takeaway: 
 
The Ninth Circuit missed the central teaching of Ernst & Ernst: 
that the statutory scheme enacted by Congress in the 1933 and 
1934 Acts strongly compels the conclusion that Congress would 
not have intended a private cause of action for mere negligence in 
the absence of the ‘significant procedural restrictions’ that it 
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imposed for the express causes of actions it created that cover 
negligent behavior . . . That applies equally to Section 14(e).307 
 
The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Aaron and Section 17(a)(2) is 
misguided.308  In Aaron, the Supreme Court held that Section 17(a)(2) of 
the 1933 Act did not require a showing of scienter.309  The Second Circuit 
has and continues to apply a scienter standard even in light of the very 
cases the Ninth Circuit claims question continuing viability of the 
foundation for Chris-Craft and the cases that followed it, all requiring 
scienter.310 
Further, and perhaps most convincingly, in Aaron the SEC was not 
pursuing a damages remedy under an inferred cause of action, but instead 
proceeded under an express public cause of action, contained in Section 
20(b) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b), which authorizes injunctive 
relief.311 
Aaron involved an express cause of action.312  Therefore, the principles 
that restrain judicial creation of an implied private remedy did not apply.313 
Moreover, because Aaron only involved a request for injunctive relief, the 
additional limits that have traditionally applied to securing damages for 
alleged fraud did not apply.314  Hence, the negligence standard can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
Aaron’s holding that a finding of scienter is unnecessary for 
issuance of an injunction in a suit brought by the SEC under the 
express cause of action for violations of Section 17(a) therefore 
by no means suggests that scienter is unnecessary to secure 
damages or other relief pursuant to any implied private right 
of action based on Section 14(e).  In any event, the fact that the 
Ninth Circuit read . . . [the Supreme] . . . Court’s decisions to 
require creation of an expansive private remedy for negligence 
that had been rejected by every other court to consider it just 
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underscores the need for [the Supreme Court’s] 
intervention.315 
 
Applying Chris-Craft and Smallwood, the Fifth Circuit followed the 
Second Circuit in requiring the same elements to establish a violation of 
either Section 14(e) or Rule 10b-5.316 
The Ninth Circuit claims that it is obvious that Chris-Craft is 
inconsistent with Ernst & Ernst and Aaron.317  However, the Ninth Circuit 
is just arguing the merits. Further, the Second Circuit declared, years after 
Aaron and Ernst & Ernst, that it remained well settled in the Second 
Circuit that scienter is a necessary element of a claim for damages under 
Section 14(e).318  Sodhi, is also instructive here, stating the following: 
 
[T]he Ninth Circuit has abandoned the requirement of pleading 
scienter for claims under Section 14(e) . . .  [N]either the Supreme 
Court . . . nor the Second Circuit has abandoned scienter as an 
element . . . under Section 14(e), and this Court therefore will 
continue to apply the current law in [the Second] Circuit . . . 
because the Second Circuit has squarely held that scienter is 
required under Section 14(e).319 
 
In light of these facts, the Ninth Circuit’s statement in Varjabedian 
that they were unsure how recent case law impacts the instant case,320 is 
misguided and shows an unjustified willingness to dismiss long held 
precedent that had existed since enactment of Section 14(e).321 
The third and final key premise for the scope of this Article highlights 
the Ninth Circuit’s failure to fully appreciate the substantial risks that a 
Varjabedian-type circuit split would foster.  The Varjabedian opinion, in 
addition to creating a circuit split by parting ways from their colleagues in 
five other circuits, lacks the necessary discussion to warrant such a drastic 
 
 315. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1, 
22 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459 (emphasis added). 
 316. Id.  
 317. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), reply brief for the 
petitioners filed, 1, 4 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2018) No. 18-459. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), reply brief for the 
petitioners filed, 1, 5 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2018) No. 18-459. 
 320. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 888 F.3d 399, 412 
(9th Cir. 2018), cert. pending, (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459. 
 321. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), reply brief for the 
petitioners filed, 1, 5 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2018) No. 18-459. 
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departure, leaving one to consider if the Court even contemplated the 
consequences of its actions, much less in a sufficient manner.322 
The Respondents’ attempt to dismiss the forum shopping problem is 
also unpersuasive, as the key economic concern in Varjabedian is not why 
this case was filed in the Ninth Circuit, but whether plaintiffs will flock to 
the Ninth Circuit if the decision is allowed to stand.323  Of course they 
will.324 
The Respondents attempt to dismiss Emulex’s petition for certiorari 
stating, inter alia, that aside from a few errant statements and some 
superficial disagreement, there is no legitimate split.325  Thus, the 
Respondents incorrectly conclude no further review is warranted.326  
Cutting against their own statements, however, the Respondents also state 
that a genuine circuit conflict does not exist in a futile attempt to explain 
away, what the Ninth Circuit itself acknowledges, as a circuit split as it 
parted ways with five other Circuits.327  Emulex is the one, in fact, that 
properly gauges the far-reaching impacts that Varjabedian has and will 
have, if not reversed, as it states: 
 
Eliminating a scienter requirement also will open the doors to a 
whole new class of defendants . . .  [T]he scienter element has 
traditionally prevented application of Section 14(e) to financial 
advisors or commentators on transactions, who, unlike, say, 
members of a board of directors, have no direct interest in the 
transaction and thus no motive for fraud.  But the Ninth Circuit’s 
new negligence standard will expose that additional group of 
defendants to suit for providing negligent advice to their clients or 
even to the public at large.328 
 
Moreover, the Respondents claim that concerns over creating a de facto 
nationwide negligence standard are unwarranted because it is geography, 
not lenient standards, that drives the Ninth Circuit’s docket.329 
 
 322. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), reply brief for the 
petitioners filed, 1, 7 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2018) No. 18-459. 
 323. Id.  
 324. Id.  
 325. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), brief for the respondents 
in opposition filed, 1, 7 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2018) No. 18-459. 
 326. Id.  
 327. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 888 F.3d 399, 409 
(9th Cir. 2018), cert. pending, (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459. 
 328. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), reply brief for the 
petitioners filed, 1, 7 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2018) No. 18-459. 
 329. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), brief for the respondents 
in opposition filed, 1, 26 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2018) No. 18-459. 
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The Respondents attempt to use statistical analysis to justify the above 
proposition claiming that approximately the same percentage of all cases 
are filed in the Ninth Circuit relative to the population it serves.330 This 
statistical analysis, however, fails to account for Section 14(e)’s liberal 
jurisdiction requirements that allows for a class action plaintiff to bring a 
suit in the Ninth Circuit if he or she satisfies the 1934 Act’s liberal 
jurisdiction provision providing that: 
 
Section 27 of the Exchange Act provides that venue is proper 
anywhere, among other places, that the defendant is found or is an 
inhabitant or transacts business.331 
 
As a result of this liberal jurisdictional requirement, a plaintiff may file 
Section 14(e) tender offer claims against a corporation in any district where 
the corporation ‘transacts business’; however, most public companies 
transact business and conduct tender offers across all 50 states.332  
Therefore, stockholder plaintiffs, then, are likely to take advantage of the 
lower negligence standard for Section 14(e) claims in the Ninth Circuit.333 
Rational economic actors are likely to respond to new constraints on 
their behavior.334  The belief that Respondents subscribe to is that class 
action plaintiffs’ attorneys will not forum shop merger objection suits, as 
the Respondent states that venue decisions are motivated by a multitude of 
considerations.335 
The Respondents’ argument is incomplete and, accordingly, 
unconvincing as members of the plaintiffs’ bar, despite their protestations 
to the contrary, are rational economic actors.336  Further, the Respondents 
conveniently fail to address the statistical reality that, the Ninth Circuit 
already attracts a disproportionate number of merger objection filings.337  
Finally, although half of all U.S. corporations and over sixty-seven percent 
of all Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware, in 2017, only 
 
 330. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), brief for the respondents 
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140 (1st ed. 2008). 
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twenty-five percent of all federal-court challenges to deals were filed in the 
Third Circuit.338 
Accordingly, the Respondents fail to provide convincing answers to the 
three key premises (summarized at the beginning of Section V of this 
Article) that aim to validate the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning.  On balance, the 
risk of creating a sudden, de facto nationwide negligence standard for 
Section 14(e) via forum shopping is substantial if the Ninth Circuit’s 




The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Varjabedian departs from half a century 
of established case law and creates a circuit split with five other circuits. 
The elimination of a scienter requirement for Section 14(e) pleadings 
exposes an entirely new class of potential defendants, namely financial 
advisors and commentators on transactions.  As witnessed following the 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s crackdown on disclosure-only fee awards, 
the plaintiffs’ bar, as a rational economic actor, does forum shop.  The 
Ninth Circuit is not immune to this established economic principle, as the 
1934 Act’s liberal jurisdiction and venue provisions will only further 
promote a de facto nationwide negligence standard for all Section 14(e) 
cases. 
In addition to both the immense financial stakes and the creation of a 
de facto nationwide negligence standard, the Ninth Circuit’s legal analysis 
in Varjabedian is misguided.  In reviewing Section 14(e)’s legislative 
history, the Varjabedian decision cuts against Rule 10b-5, which is the very 
antifraud rule after which Section 14(e) was modeled.  Moreover, the Ninth 
Circuit’s textual analysis fails to examine Section 14(e) in light of its 
appropriate context, as words in the same sentence cannot merely be read 
in isolation.  The Varjabedian decision, at its core, fails to appreciate 
private rights of actions versus SEC enforcement actions within Section 
14(e)’s appropriate context. 
The Ninth Circuit’s Varjabedian decision, for the abovementioned 
reasons, is ripe for the Supreme Court to review.  Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court should reverse the Ninth Circuit’s Varjabedian decision, 
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VII. APPENDIX
For the scope of this Article, the most relevant statutory provisions are 
provided below for convenient reference.340 
SECTION 17(A) OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 
15 U.S.C. § 77Q(A) 
§ 77q. Fraudulent interstate transactions
(a) Use of interstate commerce for purpose of
fraud or deceit
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
(including security-based swaps) or any security-based swap agreement (as
defined in section 78c(a)(78) of this title) by the use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
by use of the mails, directly or indirectly—
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading; or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
* * *
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
340. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, i,
iv (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459. 
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15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) 
§ 78j. Manipulative and deceptive devices 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange— 
* * * 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, or any securities-based swap agreement any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
* * * 
 
 
Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) 
§ 78n. Proxies 
* * * 
(e) Untrue statement of material fact or omission of fact with respect to 
tender offer 
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are 
made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or 
manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or 
request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in 
opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. The 
Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and 
regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, 
such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. 
* * * 
Rule 10b-5 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 
§ 240.10b–5 Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices. 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a)  To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b)  To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state   
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
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(c)  To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
 
